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The case is of interest as bringing again into the foreground
the question whether a corporation is really a separate entity apart from
its stockholders or merely a giant partnership with the liability of the
partners strictly limited. The prevailing opinion lays stress on the fact
that most of the owners of the corporation resided in Germany during
the war and thus leans toward the partnership theory. The dissenting
opinion stresses the entity theory and regards the corporation as a
citizen or subject of the country where it is incorporated, no matter who
its stockholders might be. Perhaps this contrariety was not consciously
felt by the writers of either opinion, yet it is possible that it furnishes
the key to the differences between them.
C. Z.
Wills: Blindness of testator; validity of will.-In re Bakke's Will,
The validity or invalidity of the execution
of wills has raised a number of very nice questions of law, among which
not the least prominent is the question of the effect of the blindness of
the testator on the validity of his will. Two questions arise in discussing this subject: first, whether a blind person has sufficient testamentary capacity and second, whether he has the ability of knowing
the contents of his will.
In Wisconsin, the statute on the execution of wills reads, "No will
made within this state . . . shall be effectual to pass any estate . . .
unless it be in writing and signed by the testator or by some person in
his presence and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
in the presence of the testator by two or more competent witnesses in
the presence of each other......,,
The statutes regarding who may devise or bequeath property read
as follows: "Every person of full age and any married woman of the
.2 This
age of eighteen years and upwards, being of sound mind,
phrase is the deciding factor in Wisconsin as to who has testamentary
capacity in the- devising of both real and personal property.
In reference to the first-named statute, the question usually evolves
around whether or not the clause "in the presence of" must be construed
so as to mean that the testator must see the persons signing as witnesses
or signing for him at his express direction. At this point, the further
question arises as to whether the testator knew the contents of the will.
Both of these questions will be fully discussed later.
In the present case, the facts were as follows: Guinhild Bakke, a
woman of sound mind but blind and partially deaf, made her will on
October II, 189o. She was a widow holding eighty acres homestead
as a life estate and 28o acres in fee. The contestant, Mrs. Stern, a
daughter, received her share of the estate when her father died. No
question of mental capacity or undue influence was raised but the only
ground of contest was the blindness of the testatrix. The defense
contended that the burden of proof resting upon the proponents was not
satisfied by the evidence and that there must be, under the circumstances,
199 N. W. 438 (Wis.).

'Sec. 2282, Wis. Stats. 1923.
'Secs. 2277 and 2281, Wis. Stats. 1923.

NOTES AND COMMENT

additional affirmative proof that the testatrix had knowledge of the
contents of the will.
Since the will was legally drawn, showed a good faith division of
the estate, and the reason for not granting a bequest to the contestant
was brought out, it was held that this was sufficient to establish mental
capacity on the part of the testatrix and an absence undue influence.
There is no special statutory provision regarding blind testators, the
law being concerned with testamentary capacity and absence of undue
influence and fraud. Such legislation or necessity for additional proof
would place an obstacle in the way of wills of the blind. This would
work a hardship on those who need greater protection rather than restriction. The due proof of a properly attested will raises a presumption
that the contents of the will were known to the testator at the time of
its execution. Here in the case of In re Bakke's Will, this presumption
was raised and not rebutted.
The defense further contended that the presumption should not apply
because of the ease with which a blind testator might be imposed upon.
This, however, does not "hold water" for the presumption is rebuttable
by proof of imposition or fraud, but fraud or undue influence cannot
be presumed from the mere fact that the testator would have been an
easy victim. Where, as in case, the will shows care, reason, thought
and attention to detail, the presumption that it was properly executed is
hard to overcome and where there is no proof of fraud or undue
influence offered, the will must be admitted.
The law in the last few years has become more settled on this question
of the validity of wills executed by blind testators as is shown by the
following extracts: Generally, if the execution of a will is proved, the
presumption of law, in the absence of proof of fraud or undue influence,
is that the testator knew the contents thereof. 3
Underhill, in his treatise on Wills, says: "Where the testator is in
good physical and mental condition and of fair education, the actual
reading of the will to him need not be proved but he will be presumed
to have known the contents, especially when the will agrees substantially
with the instructions given by the testator. However, when the testator
is blind, the presumption is not as strong and any proof of undue influence, however small, is sufficient to overcome such presumption. The
court cannot infer that the testator was acquainted with the will merely
from the fact of its due execution, but it is not necessary to prove that
the will was actually read to him before execution." 4
A situation parallel with that of the blind testator is that of the
foreigner whose instructions are given in a foreign language and the
will is written in English, the latter being impossible for him to read.
The courts have held in such cases that where it would have been impossible for the testator to have read the will, due to the fact that it
was written in English and he had given the instructions in a foreign
tongue, being unable to speak or read English, that the will was, never*Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa. 218.
'I Underhill on Wills, P. 2o1.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

the less, good where a substantially accurate translation had been made
to the testator before execution.5
Georgia goes farther than most states in permitting the probate of
wills of blind testators when its Supreme Court held that "it is not
indispensably necessary to the validity of a will executed by a blind
man that it should be read over to him in the presence of the subscribing
witnesses before execution. It is sufficient if he know that it is his
will."8( Arkansas places this matter before the jury, leaving it to them
whether or not the inability of the testator to read or hear read the
will is sufficient to deny probate. The Supreme Court of Arkansas says:
"When a will appears to have been legally executed, the onus of showing
fraud or undue influence therein is on the party contesting its validity,
and the circumstances that the testator could not read and did not hear
the will read at the time of the signing is a fact to be weighed by the
jury, with other circumstances, in determining whether or not he knew
its contents. ' 7 The question is discussed in L. R. A." and it is said
that the presumption that the testator knew the contents of the will
arises from the execution of it by the testator whose eyesight is so
impaired that he could not read the instrument.
From this, it can be seen that the whole trend of the courts has been
towards leniency in dealing with the wills of blind testators and all
possible benefits are granted in order that such wills may be admitted
to probate. The object of the courts seems to be to combine leniency
with protection and it can be seen readily that a judicious admixture of
these two policies is giving to the blind a knowledge and assurance that
they may rely implicitly on the courts to see that their wishes are carried
out, whether they can or cannot read or hear read, the will, and that the
fact of blindness on the part of a testator will not prove him to be
without mental capacity.
JOHN S. PALK.
Wills: Implied revocation by divorce of testator-property settlement.-In the recent case of In re McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich. 1 ; 199
N. W. 686, Mary H. McGraw, divorced wife of Howard A. McGraw,
deceased, presented for probate a will made by the deceased during
coverture, wherein she was made sole legatee. The marriage took place
in 1912, the will was executed in 1918. and an absolute divorce was

granted to her in 1921. No alimony was demanded nor received and
upwards of two years had elapsed after the decree, in which time it
could have been demanded. Proponent's dower was barred by the
statute of limitations. No express property settlement was made between the parties either before or after divorce. As the testator left
no children, the will was contested by his brother and sister. They
contended that the decree of divorce, with its attendant conditions and
circumstances, had wrought an implied revocation. The court held that
Benrud v. Anderson, 174 N. W. 617, 144 Minn. III.
Clifton V. Murray, 7 Ga. 565, 5o Am. Dec. 411.
Guthrie v. Price, 23 Ark. 407, 49 Cent. 270 & 389.
'L. R. A. I918 D. p. 747, Ross v. Ross, 147 N. W. 11o5,

